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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Armando Garcia appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In 2009, Garcia entered a plea of guilty to trafficking in heroin pursuant to a Rule
11 plea agreement in which he agreed to waive his right to appeal the case, including
the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. (R., p.149; Resp. Ex. C, p.2.) The
district court sentenced Garcia to thirty years with fifteen years fixed.

(R., p.149.)

Garcia filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied after a hearing.
(Resp. Ex. G.)
Garcia filed a Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief and was appointed
counsel to represent him. (R., pp.6-12, 24-28.) In his petition, Garcia claimed that his
plea agreement was breached and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
in several ways. (R., pp.6-12.) The state filed an answer (R., pp.29-34), and Garcia
filed a Second Affidavit in Support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief, alleging nine
more ways his trial counsel was ineffective (R., pp.59-63). The State filed a Motion for
Summary Dismissal and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal (R.,
pp.73-83), and Garcia filed a brief and a supplemental brief opposing the state's motion
(R., pp.89-97,122-127).

After oral argument (see generally 4/17/13 Tr.), the district

court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order granting the state's motion for
summary dismissal.

(R., pp.149-159.)

Garcia filed a timely notice of appeal.

(R.,

pp.160-164.) This Court issued an order remanding the case to the district court for

1

entry of a final judgment, and the district court subsequently filed its judgment.
pp.169-170.)

2

(R.,

ISSUE
Garcia states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed
the petition for post-conviction relief, concerning breach of plea
agreement[?]
(Appellant's Brief, p.iii (capitalization and underscore modified).)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Garcia failed to establish error in the district court's summary dismissal of his postconviction claims?

3

ARGUMENT
Garcia Has Failed To Establish Error In The District Court's Summary Dismissal Of His
Post-Conviction Claims
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Garcia contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his

claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately explain the terms of
the Rule 11 plea agreement -- namely, that the state was free to recommend any fixed
prison term it deemed appropriate. 1 (Appellant's Brief, pp.1-15.) Garcia also argues
that the trial court erred by (1) not finding out, at the time of Garcia's plea, "just what it
was that [he] did not agree with, and that [he] understood the ramifications of his guilty
plea, and not just rolling with it, for some unknown reason" (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16),
and (2) threatening him into pleading guilty by telling him that, if he did not accept the
plea agreement, the original indictment would be refiled (id., pp.16-18). Lastly, Garcia
appears to argue that his guilty plea should be invalidated because it was entered
pursuant to

I.C.R. 11 (f)(1 )(C), 2 which requires the parties to agree on a "specific

1

Garcia alleges his trial counsel tricked him into signing the Rule 11 plea agreement by
not informing him about the true nature of such agreement. (Appellant's Brief, pp.2-13.)
2

Idaho Criminal Rule 11 (f)(1 )(C) reads in relevant part:
(1) In general. The prosecuting attorney and the attorney for the
defendant or the defendant when acting prose may engage in discussions
with a view toward reaching an agreement, which may include a waiver of
the defendant's right to appeal the judgment and sentence of the court,
that upon the entering of a plea of guilty to a charged offense or to a
lesser or related offense, the prosecuting attorney will do any of the
following:

' ''
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the
case;
4

sentence," and his agreement permitted an open recommendation by the prosecutor in
regard to the fixed portion of Garcia's sentence. (Id., pp.12-13.)
A review of the record shows Garcia has failed to demonstrate any error in the
district court's conclusion that he failed to meet his burden of establishing a genuine
issue of material fact relative to any of his post-conviction claims that his trial counsel
was ineffective. Additionally, Garcia failed to preserve his "trial court error" and "specific
sentence" claims because he did not present them to the district court.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists
which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted.

Nellsch v.

State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The Court freely reviews
the district court's application of the law.

~

at 434, 835 P.2d at 669. However, the

Court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations,
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Ferrier v.
State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001).

C.

Applicable Legal Standards
Idaho Code§ 19-4906(c) authorizes a district court to summarily dismiss a post-

conviction petition upon motion by a party if it appears there is "no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In order to
survive summary dismissal, a post-conviction petitioner must present evidence in
support of his petition sufficient to make "a prima facie case as to each essential

5

element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." Berg v.
State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998). Furthermore, the factual showing
in a post-conviction relief application must be in the form of evidence that would be
admissible at an evidentiary hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d
546, 551 (1982); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App.
1999). While a court must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court
is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported
by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law.

Ferrier v. State, 135

Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873
P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).

In other words, bare or conclusory allegations,

unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary
hearing. Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901; Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156,
159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 826, 702 P.2d
860, 864 (Ct. App. 1985).
In the context of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Idaho Supreme
Court has articulated the applicable standards as follows:
For an application for post-conviction relief based on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel to survive a summary dismissal, the
petitioner must establish that: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to
whether counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) ·a material issue of
fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced the applicant's case.

To establish deficient assistance, the burden is on the petitioner to
show that his attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. This objective standard embraces a strong presumption
that trial counsel was competent and diligent. Thus, the claimant has the
burden of showing that his attorney's performance fell below the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.

6

To establish prejudice, the claimant must show a reasonable
probability that but for his attorney's deficient performance the outcome of
the proceeding would have been different. Trial counsel's strategic or
tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those
decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law,
or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation.
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-154, 177 P.3d 362, 367-368 (2008) (internal
citations omitted).

D.

Garcia Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Summary Dismissal Of
His Post-Conviction Claims
Garcia's argument that the district court erred in granting the state's motion for

summary dismissal is completely rebutted by the district court's "Memorandum Decision
and Order" (R., pp.149-159), attached as Appendix A, which is incorporated into this
Respondent's Brief and relied upon as if fully set forth herein.
Garcia makes several arguments for the first time on appeal. First, he claims the
district court erred by not finding out, at the time of Garcia's plea, "just what it was that
[he] did not agree with, and that [he] understood the ramifications of his guilty plea, and
not just rolling with it, for some unknown reason." (Appellant's Brief, p.p.15-16.) Next,
Garcia contends the trial court threatened him into pleading guilty by telling him that if
he did not accept the plea agreement, the original indictment would be refiled.
pp.16-18.)

(Id.,

Finally, Garcia alleges that because Rule 11(f)(1)(C) requires the parties to

agree "that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case" (see
Appellant's

Brief,

p.12),

and

his

plea

agreement did

not involve

a specific

recommendation by the state, his guilty plea should be invalidated. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.12-15.)

7

Garcia did not present any of his "trial court error" or "specific sentence"
arguments to the district court.

(See R. pp.6-12, 59-63; see generally 4/17/13 Tr.)

Therefore, this Court should not consider Garcia's arguments because he failed to
preserve them.

Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App.

1998) (declining to consider for first time on appeal claims not raised in post-conviction
petition); State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992) ("The
longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are presented for
the first time on appeal."). This Court should affirm the district court's decision.
In addition to the above, the state makes the following comments in regard to
Garcia's Appellant's Brief.

On pages 5 and 6 of his opening brief, Garcia quotes a

segment of his trial counsel's testimony that was presented during the hearing on his
motion to withdraw his Rule 11 guilty plea. 3 Immediately after the quote, Garcia asserts
his trial counsel's explanation of what words he used to explain the plea agreement to
Garcia "does not explain anything," and that "[e]verything else in [trial counsel's]
statement in [sic] far to [sic] vague to make any sence [sic] out of." (Appellant's Brief,
p.6.) However, Garcia omitted the subsequent and more pertinent testimony by his trial
counsel, as follows:
Q. [by prosecutor] And in that explanation, I've already heard you say

that you told him or explained to him that the State, specifically myself,
would be free to argue for fixed life; correct?

A.

Um-hmm.

Q.

Is that yes?

A.

Yes.

3

Garcia incorrectly cites to page 40, lines 6 through 25, as where the quoted testimony
is found. (Compare Appellant's Brief, p.5 with Resp. Ex. G, p.42, L.21 - p.43, L.22.)

8

Q.
Okay. And did you also explain to Mr. Garcia that the ultimate
sentence would be up to Judge Hansen?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.
Did you ever tell Mr. Garcia that he was guaranteed to be
sentenced to ten years fixed, only?

A.

I never said that.

Did you ever give any words that would lead him to believe that, in
your opinion?
Q.

A.
I did not. I made it perfectly clear to Armando that that's what I
would be arguing for. And that's what I declared success, in terms of my
personal benchmark that I set for myself in representing him.
But I also knew that I don't get to make those important decisions
with regards to the defendant and what a reasonable sentence is. That's
the Court's responsibility.
And that while I would be making a
recommendation and you would be making a recommendation, the final
arbiter of what the sentence would be, would be, in fact, the Court.
Q.

And you explained that to Mr. Garcia?

A.

I believe I did that in great detail.

Q.

Sir, I'm also looking at the Rule 11 plea agreement.

And I'm wondering if you went over this plea agreement with Mr.
Garcia, as well?
A.

I did.

Q.

And you did that before he signed the Rule 11?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And before he entered his guilty plea?

A.

Yes.

(Resp. Ex. G, p.43, L.23 - p.46, L.1.)

Contrary to Garcia's assertion that his trial

counsel's testimony did not explain anything and was vague, the record reflects that
9

counsel clearly testified (a) he told Garcia the state was free to argue for a fixed term of
up to life, (b) he explained to Garcia in great detail that the trial judge was the final
arbiter of his sentence, (c) he never told Garcia he was guaranteed a sentence of ten
years fixed, and (d) he explained the Rule 11 plea agreement to Garcia before Garcia
signed it and entered his plea.
Next, Garcia states his defense counsel "testified that he 'BATED' Garcia into
taking the plea agreement, (M.W.P., P.48, Li. 10-12,) ... but how did he bate Garcia,
thats [sic] the question."

(Appellant's Brief, p.10.)

Page 48 of the transcript of the

hearing on Garcia's motion to withdraw his guilty plea does not contain the words bait or
baited, nor does it indicate any conduct that suggests such conduct. The only time the
word "bait" was used in trial counsel's testimony was when he explained his wariness
that the prosecutor might have offered to amend the charge in order to bait Garcia into
pleading guilty -- knowing that she was going to recommend a fixed term of more than
ten years.

(See Resp. Ex. G, p.52, Ls.13-23.)

In short, Garcia's trial counsel never

testified that he baited Garcia into accepting the plea agreement.
Based on the district court's "Memorandum Decision and Order" (Appendix A),
and the above supplemental arguments, Garcia has failed to show any error in the
district court's summary dismissal of his post-conviction claims.

10

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's summary
dismissal of Garcia's petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 4th day of August, 2014.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of August, 2014, I caused two true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
ARMANDO GARCIA
#29287
P.O. Box 70010--L-106-B
Boise, ID 83707
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

1

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY~~~

2
3

4

ARMANDO GARCIA,
Petitioner,

5
6

vs.

Case No. CVPC 1024962
MEMORA1\1DUM DECISION
AND ORDER

7

8

STATE OF IDAHO,

9

Respondent.

10
11

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

12

On September I 4, 2009, Petitioner Armando Garcia entered a plea of guilty to the felony

13

offense of Trafficking in Heroin, LC. § 37-2732B(a)(6), in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2008-

14

0000062. Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate term of thirty years with fifteen years fixed.
On December 20, 2010, Petitioner filed a Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief.

15

The State filed an Answer on February 23, 2011, along with a Motion for Production of Transcripts

16

and for an Order Taking Judicial Notice of the Record in Case No. CR-FE-2008-0000062. An Order

17

for Production of Transcripts and Order Taking Judicial Notice of the Record in Case No. CR-FE-

18

2008-0000062 entered on May 16, 2011. Pursuant to a Motion to Extend Time filed by Petitioner on

19

May 6, 2011, the Court entered an Order to Extend Time on May 16, 2011. On August 29, 2011,
Petitioner filed a Motion to Unseal Pre-Sentence Report, which was granted pursuant to an Order to

20

Unseal Pre-Sentence Report Pursuant to ICR 32 entered on January 23, 2012.

21

On October 17, 2011, Petitioner filed a Second Affidavit in Support of Petition for Post

22

Conviction Relief. Pursuant to a stipulation filed on February 10, 2012, the Court entered an Order

23

Extending Time for State to File Motion for Summary Dismissal on February 23, 2012. On March

24

5, 2012, the State filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal and Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Dismissal, along with a Supplemental Motion for Production of Transcripts and for an

25

Order Taking Judicial Notice of the Record in Case No. CR-FE-2008-0000062. Petitioner's Brief in

26
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Opposition to the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal was filed on May 17, 2012. An Order for
1

Grand Jury Transcript entered on August 14, 2012.
2

Hearing on the State's motion for summary dismissal was scheduled for November 9, 2012.

3

However, the matter was rescheduled due to the need to further supplement the record. Petitioner

4

filed a Motion for Hearing Transcripts at County Expense on November 16, 2012, and an Order for

5

Hearing Transcripts at County Expense was entered on November 26, 2012. Respondent's
Supplemental Notice of & Request for Judicial Notice Pursuant to IRE 201(c) was filed by the State

6

on December 31, 2012.
7

An Order Taking Judicial Notice Pursuant to I.R.E. 201(c) entered on

January 7, 2013.

8

On February 1, 2013, Petitioner filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to the

9

State's Motion for Summary Dismissal. The matter was set for hearing on March 4, 2013, but was

10

again rescheduled due to the need for further supplementation of the record.

Petitioner filed a

Motion for Judicial Notice Pursuant to IRE 201(c) on March 8, 2013. At a hearing on March 20,
11

2013, the Court overruled the State's objection to Petitioner's motion for judicial notice and
12
13
14

15

indicated that it would consider the relevant portions of the documents at issue in connection with
Petitioner's post-conviction application.
Hearing on the State's motion for summary dismissal was held on April 17, 2013, at which
time the Court took the matter under advisement.

16

LEGAL STANDARDS
17

An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act

18

(UPCPA) is civil in nature. Accordingly, the applicant must "prove by a preponderance of evidence

19

the allegations upon which the application for post-conviction relief is based." Charboneau v. State,

20

144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007), citing Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 995 P.2d 794
(2000). Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief "is appropriate if the applicant's

21

evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903, 174 P.3d at 873,
22
23
24
25
26

citing I.C. § l 9-4906(b), (c). In reviewing the application,
[a] court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but need
not accept the petitioner's conclusions. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d
110, 112 (2001). When the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the applicant
to relief, the trial court may dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary
hearing. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990), citing
Cc,oper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). Allegations
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l

2
3

4

contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are
clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief
as a matter of law. Id
Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903, 174 P.3d at 873.
The right to counsel in criminal actions is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. The Uniform Post-Conviction

5

Procedure Act "provides an appropriate mechanism for considering claims of ineffective assistance

6

of counsel." Parrott v. State, 117 Idaho 272, 274, 787 P.2d 258, 260 (1990). To prevail on a claim

7

of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner "must demonstrate not only that his counsel's

8

performance was deficient, but that the deficient performance so prejudiced his defense as to deprive

9

him of a fair trial."

Id. at 275, 787 P.2d at 261 (citations omitted).

To establish deficient

performance, a petitioner must show that his "counsel's representation fell below an objective
10

standard of reasonableness." Id., quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). To

11

demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must show that ''there is a reasonable probability that, but for

12

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different" Parrott,

13

I 17 Idaho at 275, 787 P.2d at 261, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability
"does not mean 'more likely than not'; it means a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

14

the outcome." Esquivel v. State, 149 Idaho 255, 258, 233 P.3d 186, 189 (Ct. App. 2010), citing
15

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. "Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do

16

not make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel." Cooke v. State, 149 Idaho 233,

17

246,233 P.3d 164, 177 (Ct. App. 2010), citing Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903.

18

DISCUSSION
19

In his Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief, and Second Affidavit in Support of
20

Petition for Post Conviction Relief, Petitioner sets forth two grounds for relief: Breach of plea

21

agreement and ineffective assistance of counsel.

22

separately.

The Court ·will address each of the claims

23

Breach of plea agreement
24

In his Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief, Petitioner alleges "Breach of Plea
25

Agreement" as a ground on which he bases his application. See Petition for Post Conviction Relief

26
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at 2. Neither the petition and affidavit, nor the Second Affidavit in Support of Petition for Post
1

Conviction Relief, sets forth any details regarding how the State allegedly breached its plea
2

agreement with Petitioner. Rather, those documents deal only with bases for Petitioner's ineffective

3

assistance of counsel claims. However, attached as an exhibit to Petitioner's Motion for Judicial

4

Notice Pursuant to IRE 201(c) that was filed on March 8, 2013, is a copy of the Supplement to I.C.R.

5

35 Motion for Reduction of Sentence and Memorandum in Support (hereinafter Supplement to
I.C.R. 35 Motion) that had been filed by Petitioner on April 23, 2010, in Case Nos. CR-FE-2008-

6

0000062 and CR-FE-2008-0017452. 1 In that supplement, Petitioner stated that his ''total
7

8

understanding of his plea bargain was that he was guaranteed (10) years :fixed, with (20) years
indeterminate." See Supplement to I.C.R. 35 Motion at 9.
A defendant is "constitutionally entitled to relief when the State breaches a promise made to

9

10

him in return for a plea of guilty, because when the prosecution breaches its promise, the defendant

pleads guilty on a false premise." Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 882, 187 P.3d 1253, 1257
11

(Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted). See also Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 595, 861 P.2d 1253,
12

1260 (Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted), and Garzee v. State, 126 Idaho 396, 400, 883 P.2d 1088,

13

1092 (Ct. App. 1994), citing State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910, 915, 693 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Ct. App.

14

1985) (a breach of the plea agreement by the state affects the voluntariness of a guilty plea). For the

15

following reasons, however, the Court concludes that Petitioner's assertion that the State breached
its plea agreement in his case is disproven by the record.

16
17

18

The State has submitted a copy of the written Rule 11 Plea Agreement Pursuant to I.C.R.
ll(f)(l)(C) that was entered into between the State and Petitioner in Case No. CR-FE-20080000062. That agreement states, in pertinent part:
The terms are as follows:
1. The mandatory minimum fixed sentence will decrease from fifteen (15) years fixed, to
ten (10) years fixed;
2. The parties are open to argue the terms of the Defendant's sentence, meaning the
defense may argue the court simply impose the mandatory minimum sentence of ten
(10) years, and the state may argue the court impose up to a maximum of life in prison
as a :fixed sentence;

19
20
21
22
23
24

Respondent's Exhibit C at 1 (emphasis added).

That written plea agreement was signed by

Petitioner on September 14, 2009. See Respondent's Exhibit Cat 2. At Petitioner's change of plea

25

Court notes that Petitioner was sentenced on both cases together. However, his application for post-conviction
relief in this matter was filed in connection with Case No. CRFE 2008-0000062.
1 The

26
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.I
1

hearing on September 14, 2009, the Court placed the terms of that plea agreement on the record as
2
3

4
5

6
7
8

follows:
In this case, my understanding then is that Mr. Garcia would plead guilty to that
amended information [in Case No. CR-FE-2008-0000062] and would also plead guilty
to the indictment in case number CR-FE-08-17452.
In exchange for those guilty pleas in those two cases, the State is free to argue any
sentence up to the maximum which, again, is up to life in prison for either charge.
The defense is free to argue that the Court simply impose the mandatory minimum in
each case, which in the 062 case is 10 years in the State penitentiary and in the 17452
case, it is three years in the State penitentiary. The State has agreed in its written Rule
11 agreement to recommend that those sentences run concurrently, one ·with the other.

9

10

Respondent's Exhibit F at 4 (emphasis added). After placing the other terms of the plea agreement
on the record, the Court then inquired, "And in this case, Mr. Garcia, was that your understanding of

11

the agreement?"
12

Respondent's Exhibit F at 5-6.

Petitioner responded, "It is, Your Honor."

Respondent's Exhibit Fat 6. After questioning Petitioner as to whether he understood the minimum

13

and maximum penalties for the charges against him, the Court stated, "Now, sir, in this case do you

14

understand that I am not bound by the agreement in terms of sentencing. In other words, there has

15

been no sentencing agreement in this case and, therefore, I could impose any sentence up to the
maximum.

Do you understand that, sir?"

Respondent's Exhibit F at 17 (emphasis added).

16

Petitioner replied, "Yes, sir, I do." Respondent's Exhibit Fat 17.
17

The record demonstrates that the State did not agree to make any particular sentencing

18

recommendation with regard to fixed and indeterminate terms in Petitioner's case, and the record

19

also contradicts Petitioner's assertion that his understanding of the plea agreement was that he was

20

guaranteed ten years fixed, with twenty years indeterminate. In an application for post-conviction
relief based upon a claim that the State breached its plea agreement, where the record "shows that

21

the State did not breach the plea agreement, and where essential elements of a post-conviction
22

petitioner's claim are conclusively disproven by the record in the underlying criminal proceedings,

23

summary dismissal is appropriate. Nevarez, 145 Idaho at 882-83, 187 P.3d at 1257-58 (citations

24

omitted). Accordingly, the Court concludes that summary dismissal of this claim is appropriate.

25
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l

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims
2

In his first ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner alleges that his attorney "Lied to

3

me about the plea agreement, got me to plead under false pretenses and manipulation." Petition for

4

Post Conviction Relief at 3. Petitioner has provided no information, contained in an affidavit or

5

otherwise, to explain or support this allegation. Neither the Affidavit of Facts in Support of PostConviction Petition nor Petitioner's Second Affidavit in Support of Petition for Post Conviction

6

Relief contain any statements referencing or supporting this claim.
7

The State has provided an

affidavit of John DeFranco, who represented Petitioner at his change of plea hearing. Mr. Defranco

8

states that he "explained in great detail the ramifications of the plea agreement in the above-entitled

9

case; specifically, the fact that the State was free to argue for a fixed sentence of more than ten

10

years." See Motion for Summary Dismissal and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Dismissal, Exhibit A at 1. As noted above, the Court set forth the terms of the plea agreement on the

11

record and inquired as to Petitioner's understanding of those terms, and such terms were also
12

contained in a writing signed by Petitioner. During his change of plea hearing, Petitioner indicated

13

that he could read, write and understand the English language. See Respondent's Exhibit F at 6.

14

After the Court set forth the details of the plea agreement, including the fact that there was no

15

agreement as to sentencing, and ensured that Petitioner understood the minimum and maximum
penalties for the charges against him, the Court then inquired as follows:

16

17

THE COURT: Mr. Garcia, I do have some questions for you. As I indicated, it is my
understanding you wish to plead guilty pursuant to [a] written Rule 11 plea agreement in
these two cases to the two charges of trafficking in heroin. Is that correct, sir?

18

THE DEFENDANT: That is correct, Your Honor.
19
20
21

22

THE COURT:

In this case, sir, have you discussed this matter fully with Mr. Defranco?

THE DEFENDANT: I have.
THE COURT: Do you feel you are fully aware of the consequences of entering the guilty
plea to these two charges today?

23
24
25

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am aware.
Respondent's. .l!Xffibit F at 11-12. As noted, Petitioner has not explained or demonstrated how
Mr. Defranco allegedly lied to Petitioner with regard to the plea agreement. However, to the extent
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that Petitioner's claim is based upon an assertion that he understood the terms of the plea agreement
l

to be different than what they were, that claim is unsupported by any evidence provided by
2

Petitioner, and is contradicted by Petitioner's own statements at the change of plea hearing, as well

3

as by the written plea agreement which was signed by Petitioner. Allegations contained in an

4

application for post-conviction relief are insufficient for the granting of relief when they are

5

disproved by the record.

See Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903, 174 P.3d at 873.

Further, bare

assertions, "unsupported by specific facts, do not make out a prima facie case for ineffective
6

assistance of counsel." See Cooke, 149 Idaho at 246,233 P.3d at 177, citing Roman, 125 Idaho at
7

8

9
10

649, 873 P.2d at 903. For these reasons, the Court concludes that summary dismissal is appropriate
as to this claim.
In his next ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner asserts that his attorney "failed
to file a Notice of Appeal after I requested he do so after the Rule 11 Breach." Affidavit of Facts in
Support of Post-Conviction Petition at 1. The Court notes that Petitioner's attorney could not have

11

filed an appeal in Petitioner's case, as the written plea agreement specifically provided that
12
13

14
15

Petitioner waived his right to appeal, as follows:
The Defendant agrees to waive his right to appeal the case, this waiver includes, but is
not limited to, the adverse ruling on Defendant's motion to suppress evidence, as well
as abuse of discretion regarding sentencing.
Respondent's Exhibit C at 2. Again, this written plea agreement was signed by Petitioner. The

16

Court also placed that portion of the plea agreement on the record and examined Petitioner as

17

follows:

18

19
20

Q. Okay. In this case, then, sir, you also understand I am going to go over this in
some detail because you are giving up a significant number of rights pursuant to this
agreement.
You also understand, sir, in this case you have given up your right to appeal
any decision I have made in this case other than the denial of your motion to dismiss
for vindictive prosecution. Do you understand that?

21
22

A. I do understand that, Your Honor.

24

Q. In other words, you cannot appeal, you will not be able to appeal my denial of your
suppression motion, my granting of the State's joinder motion in this case. None of
those things can be appealed by you. Do you understand that?

25

A. I understand.

23

26
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I
'

~

Q. In this case, if I do follow the agreement, in other words, if I do run these sentence
concurrently but if I impose a sentence up to and including life, in this case, you would
not be able to appeal that decision to the Idaho Supreme Court for abuse of discretion.
Do you understand that, as well?

'

.l.

2

3

A. I do.
4

Respondent's Exhibit Fat 19.
5

Absent a breach of a plea agreement by the State, a defendant's "waiver of the right to appeal

6

as a term of a plea bargain is generally valid and enforceable." State v. Allen, 143 Idaho 267, 270,

7

141 PJd 1136, 1139 (Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted). As Petitioner waived his right to appeal

8

pursuant to the plea agreement, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice as required by

9

Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,688 (1984), caused by his attorney's failure to file such an
appeal.

10
11

12
13
14

For these reasons, the Court concludes that summary dismissal is appropriate as to

Petitioner's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his attorney's failure to file a
notice of appeal.
In his next claim, Petitioner alleges that his attorney "Failed to argue 5th Amend. violation,
coercion to make statement, No notification of Marenda (sic), and waiver."

Petition for Post

Conviction Relief at 3. However, this claim is contradicted by the record, as it is clear that such
issues were the subject of the motion to suppress Mr. DeFranco argued on Petitioner's behalf in the

15

underlying case.

See generally Respondent's Exhibit E.

Again, allegations contained in an

16

application for post-conviction relief are insufficient for the granting of relief when they are

17

disproved by the record. See Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903, 174 P.3d at 873. For these reasons, the

18

Court concludes that summary dismissal is appropriate as to this claim.
Petitioner also alleges, "Detective C. Cbristansen coerced my statement with indirect threats

19

of arrest of my sister in law, and threatened me with years of imprisonment if I did not cooperate,
20

and my attorney cooperated and participated." Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction

21

Petition at 1. Petitioner has not directed the Court to any evidence in the record that supports the

22

bare allegation that his attorney cooperated and participated in an alleged coerced statement. "Bare

23

assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not make out a prima facie case for

24

ineffective assistance of counsel." Cooke, 149 Idaho at 246, 233 P.3d at 177, citing Roman, 125
Ida.ho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903. Accordingly, summary dismissal is appropriate as to this claim.

25
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The remainder of Petitioner's claims relate to allegations that Petitioner's attorney failed to
1

investigate or adequately investigate certain matters. Those claims are as follows:
2
3

4

1.

My Attorney did not thoroughly investigate the Confidential Informant's agreement
w/DEA.

2. My Attorney failed to adequately investigate the warrantless search & seizure & did not
adequately investigate possible suppression issues in the warrantless search & seizure.

5
6

7

8
9

3. My attorney did not investigate the fact that the Confidential Informant may have
tampered with the evidence & the chain of custody may have been affected.
4. My attorney did not investigate whether there was adequate probable cause for the
traffic stop.
5. My attorney did not investigate whether or not surveillance footage of the parking lot
where the stop occurred may have revealed suppression issues.

10
11

12
13

14

6. My attorney did not adequately investigate whether or not Det. Christensen exerted
undue influence & pressure on me during my interrogation.
7. My attorney did not adequately investigate whether or not I was coerced into taking the
trip to Salt Lake City & the controlled buy.
8. My attorney did not investigate the fact that I had numerous discussions w/law
enforcement w/out my attorney present after I had requested counsel.

15
16
17

9. My attorney didn't adequately investigate whether or not law enforcement followed
proper procedures for collection of evidence.
Second Affidavit in Support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief, Exhibit A at

111-9.

However,

18

Petitioner has not provided any evidence or information regarding what, if anything, a more

19

thorough investigation of the above matters would have revealed. The Idaho Court of Appeals has

20

noted that without such information, an applicant for post-conviction relief cannot demonstrate the
prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim:

21
22
23

Bare assertions that discovery was not properly conducted or that all avenues of
investigation were not exhausted will not, by themselves, give rise to a right to relief.
An applicant must provide at least some indication of what information is missing or
how it would have been used in the defense. Without such a showing, there can be no
evidence of prejudice and a claim is subject to summary dismissal.

24
25

Jones v. State, 125 Idaho 294, 297, 870 P.2d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 1994). As Petitioner's bare assertions
and speculation regarding his attorney's alleged failure to conduct an adequate investigation does not

26
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make out a prima facie case for Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, summary
dismissal is appropriate as to such claims. See Cooke, 149 Idaho at 246, 233 P.3d at 177, citing
2

Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903.

3

CONCLUSION

4

For the foregoing reasons, it is the Court's conclusion, pursuant to LC § 19-4906(c), that the
5

State's Motion for Summary Dismissal should be granted. The State is hereby directed to prepare a
6

fonn of judgment consistent with this decision.
7

8

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this /JI,. day of June, 2013.

9

10

TIMOTHY HANSEN
ll

District Judge
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